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1  CRISES IN SPRING 2011 – JAPAN’S CALAMITY AND MENA’S REVOLUTION 
Two events currently preoccupy global news: the political unrest in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) and the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear catastrophe in Japan. Both 
events  are  very  different  in  its  nature  and  location, but  they  not  only  affect  economic 
developments within these countries but also across the world. In the current paper, the 
macroeconomic effects of both events and of a combination of both crises are analysed.  
The recent crisis in the MENA countries, especially in Libya, which is a member of the 
OPEC and a major oil supplier for some European countries, and the imminent oil supply 
shortage as well as high energy price fluctuations in the past years show that the scenarios 
depicted in ZTB (2010) are not farfetched and that energy security becomes increasingly 
important. The disruptions in Libya are estimated to reduce its oil production by three 
quarters  from  1.6  mbd  to  0.4  mbd
1.  The price  reactions  at  the  global  oil  market  were 
instantly and pressure on the oil price is expected to increase further. 
The  natural  disaster  in  Japan  on  March  11
th  has  multiplied  in  its  dimensions  and 
cumulated to a calamity of a century. The strongest earthquake in Japan’s living memory 
with  a  magnitude  of  9  on  the  Richter  scale  was  followed  by  a  tsunami  destroying 
thousands of kilometres of Japanese coast line from Sendai in the North down to Tokyo in 
the South of Honshu, taking away lives and homes of many people. Industrial plants and 
agricultural  life  were  damaged  and  four  units  of  the  Fukushima  I  nuclear  plant  were 
severely destroyed (IEA 2011a). First estimates suggest that total damages might range 
from 122 to 235 billion US-Dollars, cumulating to 2.5 to 4% of GDP (World Bank 2011). 
Reconstruction of the area is calculated to last up to five years with costs exceeding those 
from the earthquake in 1995 in Kobe. Then, 38 billion US-Dollars of public expenditures 
were used for reconstruction purposes.  
In 2008/2009, the world experienced a financial shock that began in the US and carried 
forward  to  the  rest  of  the  world  and  finally  cumulated  to  a  world  economic  crisis  of 
historical  dimension.  This  experience  still  in  fresh  memory  stimulates  the  question, 
whether  the  Japanese  natural  disaster  or  the  political  unrest  in  MENA  countries  have 
similar strong effects on the world economy.  
2  GLOBAL INTERINDUSTRY FORECASTING SYSTEM  
We have chosen to evaluate the impact of the two crises on the world economy by 
applying a dynamic interindustry model. That not only allows to estimate the impact on 
other economies in the year of the crisis but also to consider the adjustment process in the 
preceding years. Furthermore, the trade model explicitly considers first and second round 
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effects of a production slow-down in Japan or adjustment processes to an oil price shock. 
We have chosen to forecast the economic effects until 2020 with reference to a baseline 
scenario  without  the  crises  of  spring  2011.  The  intertemporal  effects  are  shown  in 
reference to the baseline scenario.  
2.1  THE MODEL 
The  Global  INterindustry  FORecasting  System  (GINFORS)  combines  econometric-
statistical  analysis  with  input-output  analysis  embedded  in  a  complete  macroeconomic 
framework  ensuring  the  accounting  identities  of  the  system  of  national  accounts.  It 
explicitly models global economic-environmental interdependencies and can therefore be 
used as a tool for concrete policy planning (Lutz et al. 2010). As a bilateral world trade 
model GINFORS links national models for 25 commodity groups and services. All EU-25 
countries, all OECD countries and their major trade partners are explicitly modelled. The 
model is based on time series of international statistics data from 1980 to 2004 and is 
currently  extended  to  2007.  Behavioural  parameters  are  derived  from  econometric 
estimations assuming bounded rationality of agents with myopic foresight. Due to the large 
number of equations, the simple and robust OLS estimation method is applied. The model 
ensures global consistency. For instance, energy use anywhere in the world is only possible 
after extraction of some energy carriers. Imports of one country are exports of another. The 
whole system is consistently linked and iteratively solved at the global level. 
GINFORS has recently been applied to various economic questions, ranging from an 
European environmental tax reform (Lutz and Meyer 2010, Ekins and Speck 2011) and 
environmental and economic effects of Post-Kyoto regimes (Lutz and Meyer 2009b) to the 
impact of higher energy prices through international trade (Lutz and Meyer 2009a). For a 
more extensive description of the model see Lutz et al. (2010). 
2.2  SCENARIOS  
The baseline scenario in GINFORS is based on the reference scenario of the IEA’s 
World Energy Outlook from 2009 (IEA 2009)
1. Even though this mainly emphasises the 
development of energy related indicators, as energy consumption is highly dependent on 
economic  activity  it  also  gives  an  indication  of  the  expected  long-term  economic 
development. Global economic activity and hence also world energy demand is steadily 
increasing  over  the  next  decade,  mainly  due  to  increasing  economic  activity  and 
corresponding energy demand in the emerging economies. 
                                                 
 
 
1   The current World Energy Outlook from 2010 assumes slightly different crude oil import costs than in the 
publication used for the reference scenario in this paper. In the current WEO (2010), oil prices are slightly 
higher in 2015 and a bit lower in 2020. The differences emerge due to the fact that world economy has 
recovered from its crisis in 2009 faster than expected. We have chosen not to adapt the updated oil import 
costs by the IEA because the implementation of the new oil price assumptions would alter the quantitative 
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The stand-alone impact analyses of production slow-down in Japan due to the natural 
disaster follows the economic implication put forward by the World Bank (2011). In its 
early  estimates,  the  World  Bank  assumes  that  the  material  damages  caused  by  the 
earthquake and the tsunami are likely to more than double total damage of the 1995’s 
earthquake in Kobe. They predict in its projection update for the Asian-Pacific region a 
slow-down of Japan’s GDP by 0.25 to 0.5 percentage points in 2011 which encompasses 
the reconstruction budget already.  
In the present scenario, the economic disruption is expected to be caused by a combined 
decline  in  private  consumption  and  in  gross  capital  formation  and  consequently  by  a 
decline in exports. Both determinants are likely to slow-down due to an increasing saving 
propensity of households in the light of devastation and due to production slow-down as a 
consequence  of  a  loss  in  capital  stock  and  electricity  shortage.  In  the  next  year, 
reconstruction efforts stimulate the economy and boost gross fixed capital formation. In 
fiscal  year 2012, the Japanese government expects to raise 9.5 billion Yen (around 79 
million Euro) for reconstruction purposes. In 2013, reconstruction budget declines to 7.75 
billion Yen (around 64 million Euro) with a still stimulating effect on investments (FAZ 
2011). Alongside, private consumption recovers as well. 
Modelling the macroeconomic effects of decreasing oil supply in GINFORS is done via 
matching global oil demand to global supply by adjusting the oil price (Lehr et al. 2011), 
which is one of the key driving forces in GINFORS. The stand-alone impact analyses of an 
oil price peak in 2011 follows the implication taken from the observed price volatilities in 
the aftermath of the political unrest in the MENA countries starting in December 2010 in 
Tunisia. The present spot oil price of one barrel of Brent oil is traded for 122.39 USD.
1 In 
the meantime, all updated economic forecasts at least for Germany have increased their 
assumptions concerning the oil price development to average 110 USD per barrel (compare 
Table 1). We follow the assumptions in 2011 by increasing the oil price from 84 USD per 
barrel in the baseline to 115 USD per barrel in 2011. This will be much higher than the 
average price in 2008 of below 100 USD/b. 
Table 1: Assumptions on oil price in USD/barrel 
  2011  2012 
IWH  110  113 
RWI  115  115 
IfW  106  95 
Sources: IWH (2011), RWI (2011), IfW (2011) 
In the following years the oil price decreases, so that from 2014 on it again matches the 
price given in the IEA World Energy Outlook (2009). This assumption corresponds to the 
one from IfW (2011, p. 6) and rests on the following observations: First, the OECD oil 
stock is relatively high compared to high oil price years 2004-2008. Although oil stocks of 
industrial nations declined in February due to Libya’s unrest, forward demand cover is 
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calculated at 58 days (IEA 2011b, p. 34). Second, effective spare production capacities of 
OPEC
1 are recorded at 4.08 mb/d which is still higher than the lowest spare capacity of 
2 mb/d recorded so far in 2008 (IEA 2011b, p. 23-25). Both factors support the assumption 
that current oil price volatility is not the result of real scarcity but of higher risk premiums 
to be paid on international markets (IfW 2011, p. 6-7). As GINFORS is based on annual 
data, the effects modelled here might only occur with some delay even though we aim at 
modelling the immediate effect of the oil price increase. We therefore assume a linear 
adjustment to the oil price in the baseline until 2014, as shown in Figure 1. Note that the oil 
price  in  GINFORS  is  the  price  for  IEA  Crude  Oil  Import  Costs  by  Type  of  Crude 
(USD/bbl)  –  Total  Crude  Imports,  which  is  an  average  price  of  oil  traded  on  all 
international markets. 
The final scenario setting combines both assumptions put forward in the two stand-
alone scenarios for Japan and MENA. Both effects are analyzed simultaneously and are 
referenced to the baseline scenario. 
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3  EFFECTS OF A REDUCTION IN JAPANESE INVESTMENT AND CONSUMPTION  
Shortly after the earthquake and the realization of the dimension of the catastrophe, first 
impact analyses estimated the effect of a possible breakdown of the supply chain on the 
German  (Prognos  2011,  DSGV  2011,  HWWI  2011,  BDI  2011)  and  other  economies 
(World  Bank  2011).  They  are  all  more  or  less  consistent  in  their  observation,  that  a 
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production shortcut in Japan does affect the world economy but the impact is rather small 
although  differences  might  exist  among  countries  depending  on  their  degree  of  trade 
relations.  
3.1  JAPAN’S RELATION TO THE WORLD 
Although Japan is suffering for nearly two decades from slow growth and deflation, 
Japan is still the world’s third largest economy measured in terms of GDP. With a positive 
current account balance, Japan’s economy produces many products that are demanded in 
other parts of the world. But its dependence on world markets is decreasing in time as the 
export/import ratio is constantly declining. Compared to other economies, exports have a 
rather small influence on total final demand due to Japan’s distinct geography, as Figure 2 
proves.  Private  and  non-profit  consumption  determine  nearly  50%  of  final  demand, 
followed by gross fixed capital formation (including construction) and state consumption.  
Figure 2: Components of final demand 
2005 - Final demand
















Source: OECD Input-Output-Table for Japan 
Around 43% of Japanese exports alone are destined for the three major trading partners 
US,  China  and  South  Korea.  Over  90%  of  Japan’s  exports  are  commodities  used  in 
industrial  processes  especially  machineries  and  equipments  like  office,  accounting  and 
computing  machineries  or  radio,  television  and  communication  equipments.  20%  of 
manufacturing exports are motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers. Accordingly, Japan’s 
possible downswing in 2011 is most likely to effect manufacturing industries the most. 
Considering the dominance of lean production processes in industries and the tendency for 
outsourcing and offshoring of processes, a shortage in specific components might effect 
the production cycle in other industries and countries very quickly. Japan is specialized in 
producing electronic equipment like semiconductor devices which are used in nearly all   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2011/1 
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kind  of  electronic  equipment  and  hardware.  Japan  produces  roughly  20%  of  world 
production of semiconductor (DBResearch 2008).  
3.2  DOMESTIC IMPACTS 
The production slow-down in Japan in 2011 are determined by a decline in private 
consumption and downswing in gross fixed capital formation. The proceeding years are 
characterized by a boom in investments due to reconstruction efforts. In total, it is expected 
that  real  GDP  in  Japan  is  lower  by  0.8  percentage  points  compared  to  the  reference 
scenario in 2011. In contrast, the following year exceeds the reference growth rate by 1.5 
percentage points and even 2 percentage points in 2013. The recovery process leads to an 
overshooting of the economic path of the reference scenario due to a statistical effect but 
also because the government funds and pushes the reconstruction process. In consequence, 
the state budget is stressed even harder which leads to an increase in state deficit and state 
debt level. Overall, the forecast assumes that Japan is able to recover from the shock within 
a year. The negative effects of a slow-down in private consumption and gross fixed capital 
formation  in  Japan  lowers  Japan’s  exports  and  imports  at  the  same  time.  The  slightly 
positive effect on the current account in 2011 is the result of a faster decrease of imports 
which  is  due  to  the  slow-down  in  private  consumption.  The  recovery  process  in  the 
proceeding years are accompanied by a slower development in the current account which 
is the result of an increasing import demand when reconstruction begins. 
The economic slow-down in 2011 in the short-run leads to a decline in government 
consumption  expenditures.  In  the  following  years,  governmental  financing  of  the 
reconstruction efforts results in an overshooting development of government consumption 
expenditures relative to the reference scenario. Up until 2020, government consumption 
expenditures decline fast in order to approximate the reference level. 
3.3  INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS 
Table 2 shows the percentage deviation of real GDP to the reference scenario for a 
selected number of countries. All countries show only minor deviations from the reference  
which confirms earlier estimates of a low impact of Japan’s economic slow-down on the 
world  economy.  China  is  the  main  trading  partner  of  Japan,  buying  19%  of  Japanese 
exports and contributing 22% to its imports, which is why China is mostly affected by 
Japan’s economic downturn with a negative deviation of 0.05% to the reference scenario. 
On the other hand, the US hardly shows any effects. Considering that, the US is the second 
most important trading partner for Japan (share in Japanese exports 16.4% and in imports 
11%) this observation is quite surprising. The reason can be found in the rather low impact 
on the US current account. In all other countries, the current account deteriorates stronger 
than in the US. Meanwhile, Korea as a regional neighbour and an also closely related 
economy shows a comparably strong negative effect of -0.04% to the reference scenario in 
2011. Table 2 also shows that all countries are positively affected by the upswing in the 
years after 2011. As the reconstruction effort boosts Japan’s economy more than it has 
been negatively affect by the damage caused by the natural disaster, all countries under 
review experience a small positive economic push. In most countries, the positive counter   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2011/1 
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effect in 2012 is twice as high as the negative effect in the previous year. In 2014, the 
effects slow down, when Japan’s reconstruction budget is exhausted.  
The growth path until 2020 slowly approximates the path of the reference scenario in all 
reviewed countries. Balancing the effects over the whole time period, it becomes evident, 
that the positive effects after 2012 outweigh the negative effects in 2011. Up until 2020, 
Japanese  economy  has  a  cumulated  positive  effect  of  0.39%  relative  to  the  reference 
scenario. Korea increases its cumulated real GDP within nine years by 0.9%, followed by 
China with a positive cumulated effect of 0.6%.  
Table 2: Real GDP in selected countries 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2020
Japan 0 -0,80  1,49 2,01 1,60 0,39
USA 0 -0,01  0,02 0,04 0,05 0,02
China 0 -0,05  0,11 0,19 0,18 0,07
Germany 0 -0,02  0,06 0,10 0,09 0,06
Great Britain 0 -0,01  0,02 0,04 0,04 0,03
France 0 -0,01  0,02 0,04 0,04 0,03
Italy 0 -0,03  0,07 0,12 0,11 0,06
Brazil 0 -0,01  0,03 0,06 0,08 0,06
India 0 -0,00  0,00 0,02 0,04 0,08
Korea 0 -0,04  0,10 0,28 0,29 0,15
OPEC 0 -0,03  0,05 0,11 0,10 0,05
deviation in % to reference scenario
 
Source: own calculations 
4  EFFECTS OF A REDUCTION IN OIL PRODUCTION DUE TO THE POLITICAL 
DISRUPTIONS IN THE MENA COUNTRIES 
Following basic economic principles, the negative oil supply shock should be followed 
by an increase in the oil price. This effect was clearly visible in the first quarter of 2011, 
when the oil price increased by about 15 to 20 USD/bbl for the OPEC oil basket (MWV 
2011,  IEA 2011b). The effects on the economies of different countries though are not 
easily identified. The extent to which a country is affected by the price impact depends on 
a number of different factors. Generally, an increase in the oil price is expected to have 
positive effects on oil producing countries and negative effects on oil importing countries 
with some time lag. Other factors are the country’s stage of industrial development, its 
energy efficiency and potential to substitute other energy carriers for oil, its trade linkages 
and geographical factors such as population density and proximity to export markets.  
4.1  MACROECONOMIC OIL PRICE EFFECTS 
There  is  a  large  number  of  studies  analyzing  macroeconomic  impacts  of  oil  price 
shocks. Extensive summaries can be found in Hamilton (2005), Kilian (2007), or Stern 
(2009). Jones et al. (2003) stress the importance of using sectorally disaggregated models 
because an oil price shock has diverse effects on different sectors. Most papers, e.g. OECD   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2011/1 
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(2004) and Fattouh (2007), estimate price elasticities of (sectoral) oil demand and find that 
short  run  elasticities  are  close  to  zero  (between  -0.03  and  -0.09),  whereas  long  run 
elasticities  are  somewhat  (according  to  Hamilton,  2008,  about  three  times)  larger. 
Additionally,  price  elasticities  seem  to  be  lower  in  emerging  economies  with  strongly 
increasing oil demand than in industrialized countries with only slowly increasing or even 
decreasing demand for oil. 
4.2  ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF HIGH OIL PRICES 
The economic effects of a sudden rise in world oil price in 2011 as shown in Figure 1 
are given in Table 3 for selected countries. The immediate effect of a price increase of 31 
USD/barrel for oil producing countries in the OPEC is rather positive. Real GDP growth 
exceeds the growth path of the reference scenario by 9.5%. Although the price increase 
cannot be passed on in full, the additional money boosts economic performance of oil 
supplying economies of the OPEC.  
Table 3: Real GDP in selected countries 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2020
Japan 0 -1,21  -1,76  -1,61  -1,07  -0,06 
USA 0 -1,81  -1,36  -1,14  -0,47  0,01
China 0 -4,62  -4,27  -2,70  -0,68  0,03
Germany 0 -0,70  -0,13  0,01 0,22 0,10
Great Britain 0 -0,14  -0,61  -0,50  -0,22  0,01
France 0 -3,91  -1,80  -0,89  0,32 0,05
Italy 0 -4,51  -2,21  -0,90  0,47 0,05
Brazil 0 -1,21  0,06 0,77 1,16 0,26
India 0 -1,56  -0,88  0,00 0,78 0,47
Korea 0 -0,86  0,87 0,11 -0,06  0,27
OPEC 0 9,45 4,37 1,22 -1,56  -0,01 
deviation in % to reference scenario
 
Source: own calculations 
All other economies face a negative deviation from the reference scenario, whereas the 
negative implications differ widely in their relative volume. The largest negative feedback 
on its economic development is recorded for China and Italy. In both economies, GDP 
declines with over 4% relative to the reference closely followed by France with minus 
3.9%. Comparably small negative  effects are recorded for Germany,  Great Britain and 
Korea with a negative implication of less than -1.0%. Keeping in mind that GINFORS is 
an annual model, impacts for 2011 have to be interpreted with some caution. Due to time 
lags incorporated in price wage mechanisms or lagged gas price reactions impacts for 2011 
are probably exaggerated and may partly become perceptible in 2012. China may well be 
able to restrain the negative oil price impacts with part of its enormous currency reserves. 
The low impact on the German economy can be explained on the one hand by its high 
share in total imports of OPEC countries. Around 9% of total OPEC imports are from 
Germany, which is the highest share among those countries under review. The US closely 
follows  with  a  share  of  8.5%.  On  the  other  hand,  Germany  has  improved  its  energy 
efficiency  and  put  much  effort  in  the  development  of  high  quality  products.  Energy   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2011/1 
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intensity has declined in Germany by 2% p.a. between 1990 and 2009. The US decreased 
its  ratio  to the  same  extent  as  Germany but  shows  a  slightly  higher  ratio.  Among  the 
European economies, only Great Britain managed a faster decline in energy consumption 
per unit of gross domestic product. With 4.8 GJ/1.000 USD this is also the smallest ratio 
recorded  in  Europe  (BMWI  2011,  Tab.  32).  This  is  closely  related  to  the 
deindustrialization  process  in  Britain.  In  2005,  gross  value  added  of  manufacturing 
industries held a portion of 18% on total gross value added which is the lowest among 
those  European  countries  under  review.  Italy,  in  contrast,  has  hardly  improved  energy 
intensity (BMWI 2011, Tab. 32). The relative strong negative impact of a world oil price 
increase on the Italian economy can be explained with the low improvement in energy 
consumption  per  unit  of  gross  domestic  product  and  its  relatively  high  portion  of 
manufacturing industries on gross value added (around 25%).  
With 31 GJ/1.000 USD, China shows a very high energy intensity which is one of the 
reasons of the strong negative impact on its economy. Additionally, China is not able to 
profit from increasing demand in oil exporting countries although its share of total imports 
of OPEC exceeds Germany’s import share.  
In the years to follow, the oil price approximates IEA price forecasts, which lowers both 
positive and negative effects on the economies. Moreover, some countries are able to profit 
from  the  oil  crises.  Brazil  and  Korea  and  with  a  year  time  lag  also  Germany  reach  a 
slightly higher growth path than in the baseline. In contrast, the economic boost in oil 
producing economies slows down and even turns negative relative to the baseline scenario 
in 2014.  
5  GLOBAL EFFECTS OF BOTH CRISES 
The last and final scenario combines both main global crises of these days: Japan’s 
calamity in the aftermath of the earthquake and the political unrest in Middle East and 
North Africa. As Table 4 proves and chapters 3 and 4 indicate, the oil price shock increases 
the effect of a production slow-down in Japan in 2011. All countries, except oil producing 
nations, face a stronger negative downturn relative to the reference scenario than in each 
stand-alone scenario. The economic upswing in OPEC countries followed by the steep oil 
price increase is only marginally lower due to Japan’s production downturn.    gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2011/1 
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Table 4: Real GDP in selected countries 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2020
Japan 0 -2,00  -0,29  0,39 0,54 0,33
USA 0 -1,82  -1,35  -1,10  -0,43  0,03
China 0 -4,66  -4,17  -2,52  -0,50  0,11
Germany 0 -0,72  -0,07  0,11 0,31 0,15
Great Britain 0 -0,15  -0,59  -0,46  -0,18  0,03
France 0 -3,92  -1,78  -0,85  0,35 0,08
Italy 0 -4,54  -2,14  -0,79  0,58 0,11
Brazil 0 -1,23  0,08 0,83 1,23 0,32
India 0 -1,56  -0,87  0,03 0,82 0,55
Korea 0 -0,90  0,96 0,38 0,22 0,42
OPEC 0 9,42 4,42 1,33 -1,46  0,04
deviation in % to reference scenario
 
Source: own calculations 
In 2012, the impact of the oil price shock still exceeds Japan’s reconstruction efforts. 
The negative implication of the oil price shock is outweighing the positive effect of the 
huge reconstruction budget initiated by the Japanese government. Only in 2013, when the 
oil price shock is further declining, the reconstruction boom leads Japan to a higher growth 
path relative to the reference scenario. The same is true also for other economies that profit 
from  Japan’s  reconstruction  effort.  Different  to  the  stand-alone  scenario  of  Japan’s 
production shortage, the combination of both effects does not lead to an overall surplus in 
gross domestic product. Only those countries that are less vulnerable to oil price increases 
like OPEC, Brazil or Korea are able to increase their level of real GDP compared to the 
baseline.  
6  CONCLUSION 
Overall, the analysis has shown that Japan’s natural disaster is likely to have hardly any 
effects  on  the  world  economy  in  general  and  its  major  trading  partners  in  particular. 
Moreover, the long-run effects function like a stimulation package to the economy. Due to 
reconstruction efforts, Japan’s economy enters a growth path which is more dynamic than 
the one of the reference scenario. In 2020, real GDP reaches a volume which is 0.4% 
higher than in the reference scenario. For all countries under review the same observation 
holds although to a lower extent. The negative implication for the Japanese economy is 
transmitted  to  other  economies  via  trade.  But  the  relative  deviation  to  the  reference 
scenario is small. GDP growth rates decline by two digit decimal numbers only. Until 
2020, the economic upswing in Japan results to a positive economic growth in trading 
partner  economies  as  well.  Korea  and  China  both  profit  the  most  from  Japan’s 
reconstruction effort, followed by two European economies: Italy and Germany.  
The valuation of total damages due to earthquake, tsunami and nuclear emergency is so 
far  only  tentative.  Higher  or  lower  damage  costs  would  alter  the  effects  on  Japan’s 
economy.  The  same  is  true  for  the  reconstruction  effort  so  far  announced  by  the 
government. But although the underlying assumptions might differ in detail, the qualitative 
effects of Japan’s 2011 drama remain the same.    gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2011/1 
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The  macroeconomic  effects  of  a  reduction  in  oil  production  due  to  the  political 
disruption in the MENA countries are considerable. An increase of world oil price to 115 
USD/barrel  decreases  economic  growth  in  all  countries  except  for  oil  producing 
economies. The degree to which a country is affected differs greatly. It depends mostly on 
country specifics concerning energy intensity, trade relations or degree of industrialization 
and energy efficiency. Generally, it can be observed that those countries with low energy 
intensity,  low  industrialization  degree  and  good  trading  relations  with  oil  producing 
economies are less negatively affected from the oil price increase than others.  
In conclusion, the analysis shows that the world economy heavily reacts on sudden 
world oil price changes but is less vulnerable to ad-hoc production shortages of leading 
industrial economies.  
   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2011/1 
 
   




BDI  (2011)  BDI-Aussenwirtschafts-Report.  2/2011.  Bundesverband  der  deutschen 
Industrie e.V. Berlin. 
BMWI  (2011)  Zahlen  und  Fakten:  Energiedaten  –  nationale  und  internationale 
Entwicklung.  Bundesministerium  für  Wirtschaft  und  Technologie.  Update 
13.01.2011. Berlin. 
DBResearch (2008) Halbleiterproduktion in Deutschland: Asiens Standortvorteile locken. 
Aktueller Kommentar. 24. Oktober. 2008. 
DSGV (2011) Informationen zur Wirtschaftslage – März 2011. Deutscher Sparkassen- und 
Giroverband. Berlin. 
Ekins, P. and Speck, S. (2011) Environmental Tax Reform (ETR): Resolving the conflict 
between Economic Growth and the Environment. Oxford University Press. 
Fattouh, B. (2007) The Drivers of Oil Prices: The Usefulness and Limitations of Non-
Structural  model,  the  Demand-Supply  Framework  and  Informal  Approaches. 
Working Paper 32. Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, March 2007. 
FAZ (2011) Japan – Die teuerste Naturkatastrophe aller Zeiten. Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung.  FAZ.NET.  23.  März  2011. 
http://www.faz.net/s/RubB08CD9E6B08746679EDCF370F87A4512/Doc~E3F14B
5D9AFDD4D27AE458F2BB665EF31~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html  
Gupta,  E.  (2008)  Oil  vulnerability  index  of  oil-importing  countries.  Energy  Policy  36, 
1195-1211. 
Hamilton, J.D. (2005) Oil and the macroeconomy. In S. Durlauf and L.Blume (eds), The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed., Palgrave MacMillan Ltd. 
Hamilton, J.D. (2008) Understanding crude oil prices. Department of Economics, UC San 
Diego, December 2008. 
HWWI (2011) Aufschwung in Gefahr (?). Pressmitteilung 15. März 2011. Hamburgisches 
Weltwirtschaftsinsitut. Hamburg. 
IEA (2009) World Energy Outlook. Paris 
IEA (2010) World Energy Outlook. Paris 
IEA (2011a) Energy facts about Japan following the March 11 earthquake. 25 March 2011. 
International  Energy  Agency.  Paris. 
http://www.iea.org/files/japanese_update_250311.pdf  
IEA (2011b) Oil Market Report. 15 March 2011. International Energy Agency. Paris. 
IfW (2011) Weltkonjunktur im Frühjahr 2011. Kieler Diskussionsbeitrag 488/489. Institut 
für Weltwirtschaft. Kiel. 
IWH (2011) Konjunktur aktuell: Aufschwung in Deutschland setzt sich kraftvoll fort. In: 
Wirtschaft im Wandel. Jahrgang 17 (3). 2011. pp. 96-120. 
Jiménez-Rodríguez, R. (2008) The impact of oil price shocks: Evidence from the industries 
of six OECD countries. Energy Economics 30, 3095-3108.   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2011/1 
 
   
© GWS mbH 2011 
 
13 
Jones, D.W., P.N. Leiby, and I.K. Paik (2004) Oil Price Shocks and the Macroeconomy: 
What Has Been Learned Since 1996, Energy Journal 25(2), 1-33. 
Kilian,  L.  (2007)  The  Economic  Effects  of  Energy  Price  Shocks.  (published  2008  in 
Journal of Economic Literature 46 (4), 871-909.)  
Korhonen, I. & Ledyaeva, S. (2010) Trade linkages and the macroeconomic effect of the 
price of oil. Energy Economics, 32 (4), 848-856.  
Lehr, U., Lutz, C. and Wiebe, K.S. (2011) Medium run economic effects of peak oil. GWS 
Discussion Paper 2011/xx, forthcoming. 
Lutz, C. and Meyer, B. (2009a) Economic impacts of higher oil and gas prices. The role of 
international trade for Germany. Energy Economics, 31, pp. 882-887. 
Lutz,  C.  and  Meyer,  B.  (2009b)  Environmental  and  Economic  Effects  of  Post-Kyoto 
Carbon Regimes.  Results of Simulations with the Global Model GINFORS. Energy 
Policy, 37, pp. 1758-1766. 
Lutz, C. and Meyer, B. (2010) Environmental Tax Reform in the European Union: Impact 
on CO2 Emissions and the Economy. Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, 34, pp. 1-10 
Lutz, C., Meyer, B., and Wolter, M. I. (2010) The Global Multisector/Multicountry 3-E 
Model GINFORS. A Description of the Model and a Baseline Forecast for Global 
Energy Demand and CO2 Emissions. International Journal of Global Environmental 
Issues 10(1-2), pp. 25-45.  
MWV  (2011):  Rohölpreisentwicklung  2007-2011.  Mineralölwirtschaftsverband  e.V. 
(Association  of  the  German  Petroleum  Industry).  Data  downloaded  March  25
th, 
2011 from http://www.mwv.de/cms/front_content.php?idcat=14&idart=61 
OECD  (2004)  Oil  price  developments:  Drivers,  economic  consequences,  and  policy 
responses. OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 412, Paris, 2004. 
Prognos  (2011)  Japan:  Ein  Abbruch  der  Lieferketten  aus  Japan  ist  für  Deutschland 
verkraftbar  –  einzelne  Branchen  wären  aber  erheblich  getroffen.  23.  März  2011. 
Basel 
RWI (2011) Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung im Ausland und im Inland zur Jahreswende 
2010/2011.  RWI  Konjunkturbericht.  Jahrgang  62  (2011)  Heft  1.  Rheinisch-
Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung. Essen.  
Stern, D.I. (2009) Interfuel substitution: A meta analysis. Australian National University 
Environmental Economics Research Hub Research Reports No. 33, Canberra, June 
2009. 
wiiw  (2008)  Economic  and  trade  policy  impacts  of  sustained  high  oil  prices.  wiiw 
Research Report 346, Vienna, April 2008. 
World Bank (2011) East Asia and Pacific economic update 2011. The recent earthquake 
and tsunami in Japan: implications for East Asia. Volume 1.  
ZTB  (2010)  Teilstudie  1:  Peak  Oil  –  Sicherheitspolitische  Implikationen  knapper 
Ressourcen.  Zentrum  für  Transformation  der  Bundeswehr,  Dezernat 
Zukunftsanalyse, Strausberg, Juli 2010.   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2011/1 
 
   
© GWS mbH 2011 
 
14 
 